Today's Zaman
Wednesday, July 13, 2011,
HALIT GÜLŞEN
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has been going on for approximately 20 years now, has so far failed to reach a permanent solution.
The initiatives of the Minsk Group, which have increased in recent years (especially after the Russia-Georgia war in 2008), and the Madrid Principles put forth in 2007 have also failed to bring the parties in the conflict to find a middle ground. The leaders, who have frequently come together to discuss a solution, most recently met in Kazan, but again no results have been obtained. Azerbaijani and Armenian officials continue to direct accusations at each other. There is more than one reason for this situation.
First of all, we should draw attention to the following point: If there is a conflict between any two countries, under normal conditions it would be expected of both sides to make concessions on some points in order to reach a solution. However, normal conditions unfortunately do not apply to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because there is no concession that Azerbaijan could make since 20 percent of its territory is under occupation. Therefore, the side which must make concessions is Armenia. However, not only is Armenia not willing to make this concession, there is also no power willing to push Armenia to make this concession.
The second point concerns the Madrid Principles, which were put forth by the Minsk Group in order for a solution to be reached. However, it is very difficult for the Madrid Principles, in their current form, to be adopted and implemented by the parties. The essential reason for this is that although the principles foresee the Armenians withdrawing from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, they leave the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a referendum to be made in the following years. It is very clear that this means that Azerbaijan will lose Nagorno-Karabakh and, therefore, there is almost no possibility for Azerbaijan to accept these kinds of suggestions. The problem reaches a deadlock regarding what the status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be.
On the other hand, if the parties are able to reach a compromise on the Madrid Principles, there is a possibility that the following scenario will arise:
In terms of Armenia: Although Armenia will get what it wants in Nagorno-Karabakh if the principles are adopted, evacuating the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh will elicit strong reactions from the public. According to this argument, recent opposition protests in the country will give way to much greater mass demonstrations and this situation will create complications for the country. Moreover, how Nagorno-Karabakh, surrounded by Azerbaijan, will be affected by this situation is another big question that would need to be addressed.
In terms of Azerbaijan: If Azerbaijan adopts the principles in their current form, this will have more significant consequences for it compared to the consequences for Armenia because leaving the status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a referendum to be made 10-15 years later will cause the Aliyev administration to face the potential of massive protests. Furthermore, it is also likely that cracks will occur within the administration. This situation could pave the way for instability, whose end cannot be predicted, within the internal politics of Azerbaijan.
As can be seen, the Madrid Principles have the potential to uncover much deeper problems, especially in the medium and long terms. On this point, attention must be drawn to the approach of the Minsk Group and of Russia in particular.
Despite the fact that the Minsk Group has been holding negotiations with the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for approximately 20 years, that it has still not being able to obtain results raises questions about its function and efficiency. In Azerbaijan especially, serious concerns exist that the Minsk Group is pursuing a policy of delaying. As a matter of fact, we should note that this view is not that incorrect because there is a situation in Nagorno-Karabakh such that changing the existing status quo, even with a text of peace, could create unexpected results in the region. Since the results cannot be predicted, the Minsk Group and co-chairs are proceeding cautiously. However, it is quite clear that South Ossetia and Abkhazia declaring their independence following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 has created concerns within the Minsk Group, as nearly 15 meetings have been held between the leaders since that year. Rather than increasing the frequency of the talks, the Minsk Group co-chairs should clearly convey their stance regarding the status of Karabakh. Or else, it will be quite unlikely to obtain a result from the talks concerning a just resolution.
On the other hand, as a dominant power and a Minsk Group co-chair, Russia could influence the policies of both countries. Russia is the big power most able to bring both parties together at the negotiation table and which could apply pressure over Armenia in particular. Until now, Russia has been the country benefitting the most from a solution not being reached because the current situation causes both Armenia and Azerbaijan to become more dependent on Russia in both regional and international politics. In this context, the key to the Nagorno-Karabakh deadlock is in Russia’s hands.
Amid all of this complexity, responding positively to the question of whether the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be truly resolved through politics and diplomacy is very difficult.
Halit Gülşen is a Russia-Caucasia researcher working with the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM).
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